



*The 15<sup>th</sup> International Scientific Conference*  
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT  
IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY”**  
Braşov, November 12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> 2020



**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF KHOMEINI’S AND FARAJ’S  
FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES. STRATEGIES  
FOR THE INSTALLATION OF AN ISLAMIC STATE**

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**Abstract:**

Religious fundamentalism, a concept of the twentieth century does not necessarily imply extremism. Following the interpretation of sacred writings, the meaning of internal or external jihad, as well as for the other concepts is adapted to current conditions and needs. The movements are fundamentalist Islamic, because they use in the first instance the sacred texts to decipher distinct solutions to current problems. Islam has undergone a long evolution, initially being moderate and later radicalizing within the Muslim Brotherhood. Faraj's and Khomeini's manifests combine both similarities and distinct features in relation to the way in which they should act and the strategies that should be implemented for the installation of an Islamic State, governed by Islamic law. The historical context facilitates knowledge as it defines the framework in which a certain movement evolved. This work is presenting the realities of Egypt and Iran, respectively, but also the way in which fundamentalist interpretations shaped the state construction of these states.

*Key words: Islam; radicalization; fundamentalism; religion; state; jihad; purity.*

**1.Introduction**

Starting from the primary texts of Muhammad Abd al - Salam Faraj and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, I aim to synthesize the fundamentalist features of their movements according to the five criteria I will define further. Taking into account that the two start from the sacred texts I will finally ascertain both the similarities and the differences between them. In order to be able to answer and generate viable solutions to the problems imposed by the specific historical context I will outline the different elements and individual interpretations that Faraj and Khomeini gave to the sacred texts. I intend to reveal those features of the movements that would frame them in the concept of religious fundamentalism. In other words, I want to define the concept of religious fundamentalism by synthesizing in this sense the basic characteristics of the movements and the features of Faraj’s and Khomeini's ideologies. Also I will find the relationship between the two. In the theoretical part, I briefly present that religious fundamentalism does not have a strictly Islamic foundation in the sense that in the initiation phase it was in fact a construct or a definition that emerged from the Christian circles from the USA. At the same time, I will synthesize the general characteristics of religious fundamentalism and define Islamic fundamentalism based on the interpretations of the truths of sacred texts and I will present the reasons for resorting to them. Therefore, I will construct the radical Islamic ideological profile of Faraj's and Khomeini's movement by appealing to the following works: "The Neglected Duty" and "Governance of the Jurist", respectively.

The end of the nineteenth century and the period of the twentieth century in the United States is characterized by a series of movements that sought to resume the interpretation of biblical texts and taking into account the context in which they lived, also to recall the truths that



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should guide Christians. At that time, the movement still was having weak political orientations, guided in the foreground by moral considerations. At first we can talk about American Protestants who practiced the literal reading of Scripture. Most of the time this network of religious associations, Bible institutes, well-known evangelicals had acted to restore an essentially private, non-political, strictly community response to the moral dilemmas of the ordinary Christian facing the challenges of modernity: secularization, liberalization of morality, undermining the traditional meanings of family and sexuality. Ronald Reagan, the 40th president of the United States, had an electorate that voted for him largely for religious reasons. He relied on religious voters, a period in which clerical movements are gaining more and more political value. Therefore, religious fundamentalism is a concept of the twentieth century.

## **2.Theoretical approach – defining religious fundamentalism**

The phenomenon of “religious fundamentalism”, as well as other concepts in the socio-human sciences are easily questionable, meaning that distinct specialized authors define the same object of study in different ways, placing more or less emphasis on certain features as relevant or on the contrary, of low importance. However, different principles can be synthesized to facilitate the framing of a certain movement in the concept of religious fundamentalism. Extensive sociological research has identified 5 such features. [1]

The basic and most representative feature of a fundamentalist movement is the reactivity to secularization. Fundamentalists believe that because of the secularism of the modern world, their religion is in mortal danger. This element can be defined as a defensive reaction of a religion that feels threatened by the process of secularization, appearing most often in Abrahamic religions such as Islam. At the same time, Christianity is an Abrahamic religion in which baptism is a renunciation of evil and a reunion with Jesus, a descendant of Abraham. This aspect appears especially in religions that defend their purity as being important for contact with God. In this context, fundamentalists seek physiological purity in a way that is reactive to the impure secular world. Also, the purity used to maintain a privileged relationship with God can manifest in the social sense. In the case of certain movements, the conflict between fundamentalists and modernity encompasses all spheres of life. However, examples such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda do not reject modernity in an instrumental sense, using modern means of communication or other innovations, but reject it in an ideological sense. However, religious fundamentalism is at odds with modernity which brings with it a series of changes and is often used for political purposes. It is practiced both to legitimize the position of a particular group which by its own interpretation of the holy text propagates the truth and vice versa, namely the delegitimization of the authority established at a given time.

Fundamentalists must resist in various ways and are essentially oppositional. They must have an enemy and fundamentalism is dualistic. They perceive the world in binary oppositions: God and the Devil, good and bad, truth and falsehood.<sup>[2]</sup> This dualism can also be understood by correlating with the first principle, in other words it is a dichotomous division between those considered to be enemies and the right groups, those who respect the rules and who legitimize themselves by preaching the truth and what is good. Therefore, we notice a moral and spiritual Manichaeism in which the fundamentalists represent the camp of the good and the rest being evil. However, even their less pure classmates are still perceived as evil. For example, in the case of ISIS, atheists, those of other religions, but also Ishmaelites and Shiites are perceived as evil. The Qur'an in its original version does not preach murder, being considered a sin to kill a



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Muslim, an act condemned to hell. But analyzed from the perspective of jihad that justifies an ideology of fundamentalism, murder is allowed and even legitimized.

Another fundamentalist precept is the belief in the holy book which has supreme authority over how people should think and act. It reveals God's will for mankind. However, the interpretation of the holy book by fundamentalists is selective.[3] The selective character refers to the multitude of interpretations of sacred texts that stand out and focuses only on certain aspects that show interest at a given time and the rest are ignored or are considered irrelevant for that context. This feature refers to hermeneutics and involves taking over only specific passages or fragments and interprets the text emphasizing only those aspects. A correct reading should refer to the whole text and selectivity implies a break from the context and leads to ideological exaggeration.

A principle correlated with that of selectivity is the literal reading which refers to the taking over in the very sense of certain precepts from the holy books. The problem is that the sacred texts were written in other social and historical contexts, a time when things looked different. If one resorts to a literal reading and not a contextual one, it leads to absurdities and exaggerations. Based on theological interpretations, the Bible, for example, has many books, some of them such as the "Book of Revelation" being especially appreciated by the laity. Starting from this fact, the Orthodox and Catholic Church did not leave to the laity the interpretation of these books, because it should be read symbolically and not literally.

Fundamentalists maintain a millennial view of history, assuming that God will establish His rule over the world at some point in the future.[4] This principle is also known as messianism which indicates on the one hand the coming of the Messiah and on the other hand, the expectation of the liberator who saves the people and the entire religious community from injustice and death. Depending on religion, the Messiah can have distinct traits. The caliphate is a form of theocratic political organization that involves the leadership of a caliph who is a descendant of Muhammad. For example, for the Shiites the 12th Imam is a messianic figure who appears at the end of the world. In this context can be enunciated the concept of eschatology that defines the doctrine of the end of the world in which the Messiah comes and saves the believers. Millennialism was also an ideology in which many Christians and Christian sects who embraced the idea of the end of the world believed that after the year 1000 Jesus comes and will follow 1000 years of happiness on earth. This principle can be represented in the form of a theocracy that foretells a good age in which religious leaders rule. Thus, millenarianism can be translated as a doctrine of paradise on earth. Some intellectuals had deciphered this happiness as a political plan, the example of Karl Marx being eminent. Waiting (passive form) and haste (active form) are fundamentalist elements correlated with the idea of coming with a perfect society.

The Qur'an is not a fundamentalist text, but the ideological message of both radical and moderate Islamism arises from manipulations of the truths of sacred texts that are adapted to a specific context. In this sense the Qur'an is not a primary source to perceive certain particular aspects of a movement. Islamism should encompass all aspects of society, from the way it is governed to education, culture and the economy.[5] The appeal to the fundamental sacred texts is made in order to decipher in them individual solutions to problems posed by the present. The ideological concepts and theses of Islam are modern constructs.



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### **3. Foray into history**

To understand the essence of Islamic fundamentalism, it is necessary to delve into history and present the genesis and evolution of the phenomenon. It must be argued that the Muslim world has witnessed a dramatic change in politics and political thinking in the modern age.[6] From its origins until now, there is a qualitative transformation in terms of the character of this fundamentalist movement, in the early stages being more moderate, so that later it had experienced a radicalization.

From the end of the Middle Age to the eighteenth century, rivalry with the West raised more and more questions about the historical success of the Islamic order.[7] Dissident voices appear, Ibn Taymiyyah in the fourteenth century, Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century, proposing a return to a literal reading of the Qur'an and strict observance of its prescriptions.[8] Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab maintains such a radical tendency, arguing for the need for jihad if one strays from the beliefs of the Qur'an. Resuming the idea mentioned in previous passages, regarding the opposition of fundamentalists in relation to modernity and to a large extent also to the West, I can say that in some periods, Muslims did not perceive the West as a fierce enemy that must be annihilated. They used numerous thinking patterns typical for Westerners, namely criticism and rationalism. This is the case of the Salafist current that appeared in the nineteenth century having as promoters Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al - Din al - Afghani. Even if the two do not maintain a completely identical position, they still show a moderate discourse on the issue of modernization. Salafists condemn religious fanaticism and insist on the need for critical, rational reinterpretation adapted to contemporary social and political needs.[9] The new historical circumstances defined by the end of the Second World War bring to the fore an innovation related to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman general, Mustafa Kemal, who later took the name Kemal Ataturk, dismantled what was left of the mortal Ottoman Empire and installed a nation-state, the Republic of Turkey, in its place. Ataturk abolished the caliph's institution and sent all members of the Ottoman family into exile.[10] In his speech in 1927, Ataturk explained that for the sake of the utopia of establishing an Islamic State worldwide, the Turkish state and its handful of people could not be subjugated in the service of a caliph.[11] This event is of interest because it has forked the tendencies and aspirations of Muslim states, some advocating secularization, while others wanted to follow the scriptures. The events preceding the fall of the Ottoman Empire diminished the aspiration of the states to follow the path of secularization, a period in which radical tendencies intensified. In this context the nomination of the Muslim Brotherhood which through its promoters initially had a more moderate character is essential.

#### **3.1 Egyptian path**

Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, was a charismatic leader and organizer.[12] He was a follower of the religious state, but he was the representative of the moderate current in the sense that he did not perceive jihad as a form of justice in the Qur'an. Later Mawdudi and Qutb reached the helm of the organization, providing a much more comprehensive and coherent doctrinal body.[13] Qutb gave this current a much more radical facet by taking from the Qur'an the sequence, "Those who do not act in accordance with God's will are unbelievers".[14] God's sovereignty is exclusive and people must obey God, but also must obey those leaders who in turn obey God. Qutb perceives jihad as a necessary, legitimate form of resistance to unbelievers, but also to Muslims who had lost their faith, in other words,



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the apostates. After the execution of Qutb, his disciples, including Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj will carry on this radicalized and anti-Western version of Islamic fundamentalism.[15]

Between 1952 and 1967, Gamal Abd al-Nasser was the embodiment of what the Arab world wanted to be, assertive, independent, and engaged in building a new society liberated from the imperial past.[16] To a large extent he succeeded in strengthening the power of Egypt, the removal of the imperial powers being indisputable. The secular regime was not perceived positively by Qutb. The Muslim Brotherhood was an opponent of the established leadership, even though in some phases they had closer relations. The antagonism was justified by the decline of the Islamic world in such a government. In 1954 a member of the Muslim Brotherhood tried to assassinate Nasser. The Revolutionary Command Council, which served as an executive body of the government, executed 6 leaders of the organization and deprived hundreds of members of their liberty.[17] Following Qutb's execution, Faraj cooperated with a group called Al-Jihad, whose main goal was to overthrow the Egyptian president and establish an Islamic state based on Sharia, through revolution and violent agitation.[18] Al Faraj, Qutb's successor in believing that the secularization of Muslim states implies a decline in the Muslim world, focuses primarily on internal issues in the sense that in Islamic society more and more people are characterized as apostates, and the struggle with these is paramount. This loss of faith is, in Faraj's view, a direct consequence of the corruption of citizens by the secular leadership, and its annihilation through jihad is legitimate and essential. The West is also perceived as an enemy of the Islamic world, but Faraj's speech is eminently dominated by the certainty of the need for internal struggle. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, tried to break the diplomatic deadlock with Israel and outline a new economic trend to guide Egypt.[19]

### **3.2 Iranian path**

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Iran had a form of rule degraded and removed from modernity, thus being an old imperial monarchy whose dynasty had been established for centuries. The state has shortcomings in the administration and management of domestic resources. The main oil companies and other industrial enterprises of major importance for the economy had been monopolized by Western companies that had access to Iran after obtaining advantageous concessions they receive from the Shah through corruption schemes. The increased inefficiency of the authority in parallel with a weak bureaucratic apparatus has led the state to an unacceptably high rate of unemployment and poverty. Social dissatisfaction is beginning to manifest itself through the demands it puts forward, such as the modernization of the state, its endowment with modern institutions and more freedoms. The demands of the population materialized in a constitution, a point that also marked the decline of the imperial dynasty. Reza Khan being commander of the Cossack garrison, took control of Tehran with the help of 3,000 soldiers and 18 machine guns. This coup marked the beginning of a new era, with Reza Khan crowning himself monarch in 1926. He built his new state on 2 main pillars, the military and the bureaucratic. During his leadership, the military field experienced a tenfold increase. Government revenues have increased, the rural gendarmerie and the urban police have been strengthened. He built both roads, railways and new hotels and industries.[20] In other words, Reza Shah had high demands on the modernization model of the state, choosing to streamline many aspects of its operation and did not exclude the private capital of Western companies. But despite all these successes, some aspects were not sufficiently addressed, in the sense that the requirements and needs of all social groups were not met, the cleavages still being



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very large. He remained in Shah position until the Anglo-Soviet invasion of 1941.[21] Its decline has been catalyzed by two events. Reza Shah had a control mechanism through which he monitored access to parliament and determined the results of each election.[22] In other words, he showed certain authoritarian tendencies. In addition, a turning point for which he was removed from power was the dissatisfaction of the great powers in regard to Iran's intense relations with Germany. These 15 years can be described as the era of Reza Khan.[23] Even after this moment, a descendant of the Pahlavi dynasty becomes the head of the state, namely the son of the former Shah. In order to facilitate access to oil and a corridor to the Soviet Union, the Allies considered it an effective measure to remove Reza Shah, but also to preserve the state he created.[24] The increased interest in resources arising in the context of necessity raised during the war. Muhammad Reza Shah subordinated himself to the great powers that controlled the way he managed the state. In the post-war period, Iran became politically unstable. In 1949 several political parties and interest groups joined under the leadership of Muhammad Mosaddiq and formed the National Front. The issues nominated by Mosaddiq and the National Front were gaining control over the British-dominated oil industry in Iran. These companies were so abundant that they gave the impression of the existence of one state within another state.[25] The position he was conducting displeased Western companies based in Iran, so that later, through American intervention, Prime Minister Mosaddiq could be removed from power. From 1951 to 1953, he mobilized society to try to regain national sovereignty and establish an alternative to royal autocracy. His overthrow marked the triumph of the forces he opposed. The coup of 1953 led to the return of the royal dictatorship and an intensification of US intervention in Iran's internal affairs.[26] Before the removal of the prime minister, Muhammad Reza Shah manages to seize power in his own hands, while being supported by both external and internal forces, namely local industrial elites. He restarted the desire to develop the three pillars in his state, military, bureaucratic and court patronage system. The Shah used these tools to replace the existing cabinet and parliament with his own and amended the constitution, giving him the authority to appoint prime ministers.[27] In other words, it aimed to modernize Iran in a fast pace, to import technologies, to improve the educational system, to solve the agrarian problem by making use of foreign investments for this purpose. It is true that the White Revolution provided some farmers with land, tractors and fertilizers, but it is equally true that this revolution did not in any way affect a large part of villagers. Many peasants did not receive land. Many villages were without electricity, schools, roads and other basic necessities.[28] In addition to the peasants, the White Revolution also outraged young people in the middle-class cities, both religious and secular, meaning they did not enjoy social support, except for some large industrialists who remained loyal and close to the Shah. At the same time, Muhammad Reza Shah aimed to build a secular state and to suppress religious groups. Therefore, in such circumstances, the White Revolution did not create a popular loyalty to the regime.[29] Subsequently, the society shows solidarity and begins to manifest a negative trend towards the Shah.

#### **4.State-Building according to Muhammad Abd al - Salam Faraj**

Following the presentation of historical facts we can perceive the framework and circumstances in which a particular phenomenon evolved. I plan to highlight the theoretical construction of Islamic fundamentalism in the interpretation of Al-Faraj. Starting from the work "The Neglected Duty", which is, in fact, a personalized interpretation of the holy Islamic texts, I am looking to outline the concepts, strategies and ideological provisions expressed by the author.



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At the same time, I will resort to secondary texts that reveal certain interpretations and discussions regarding the primary text.

God's prescriptions are an obligation for Muslims.[30] In other words to support its cause and political movement, Al-Faraj evokes the truth of the Qur'an and sacred texts that have unquestionable authority over how it should be acted. The religious motive remains persistent and ubiquitous, thus legitimizing all the actions taken by the leader. The establishment of an Islamic State is an obligation for Muslims. This entity to be based on the law of Islam is only a first point. In other words, Muslims advocate the establishment of an Islamic caliphate based on the existence of a territorial nucleus from which to develop.[31] This new Islamic State will wage war with the rest of the world, evoking the expansionist ideas of the medieval Islamic community.[32] In this context, I discern a polarity, being made a clear distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, the exponents of the first camp perceiving those in the second as enemies. Even so, Faraj holds a much fiercer stance towards apostates than towards people of other religions than Islam. It proposes a definition of what it means and who can be considered a Muslim and who cannot receive this label. Therefore, Faraj gives to the concept of unbeliever the meaning of a person who acts in a way contrary to the rules sent by God,[33] but in this category can be included not only non-Muslims. Faraj states that unbelievers are also those who do not adhere to Sharia and to the precepts of Islam even if they profess the Islamic faith,[34] namely the apostates. It is an internal struggle aimed at eliminating unbelievers, especially from the leading positions of the state. Faraj's desire is to assassinate Egyptian President Muhammad Anwar El-Sadat and remove officials from the established secular government. Faraj claims that unbelievers have entered Egypt and these unfaithful rulers make the law here,[35] the only law that can rule is that one derived from the truths of Islam. Faraj opts for an internal struggle to remove the apostates and the functions of the state are to be fully occupied by the true believers, this process marking the rupture from the old system. I will discuss explicitly about the internal jihad and the significance that Faraj gave it in a separate paragraph. The need to create an Islamic political party raises two alternatives. On the one hand, the movement would gain a political accent and the party would compete for power alongside others, in this regard making it possible to recover the religious state. On the other hand, it would trigger side effects. This would mean collaborating with the pagan state. Moreover, the party would be part of the legislative power that adopts laws without regard to God's law.[36] At the same time, the cleansing of the old system is possible by depoliticizing and removing from the influence of this leadership the modern mass media which is also corrupt.

This community differs from other religious communities in that it involves struggle. A Muslim has above all the duty to fight.[37] Therefore, jihad, according to Faraj, is a legitimate instrument of struggle with apostates within the system and is useful for the restoration of God's law. This tool can be used in various situations such as the case when infidels come to the country, when the Imam calls for battle or when two armies meet.[38] Jihad is perceived as an individual duty of every Muslim and the religious beliefs on which it is based are justified by holy law. Faraj seems to be discouraged by the stalemate in which Muslims find themselves, motivating this depression by corrupting many Muslims and neglecting the duty of jihad. This duty is individual as well as others, such as prayer or fasting and entails the obligation to fight for God.[39] Faraj's appeal is simplistic, populist and provides justification for military action: the end, an Islamic state, justifies the crimes. The focus is on an internal enemy to be counteracted, which is much closer than an external one such as the West. Jihad, a strong



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ideological concept helps to create a dichotomous world consisting of non-Muslims and a small community of true Muslims.[40]

In 1981, the Al-Jihad group assassinated the president of Egypt. The organization evolved from a group of students from Egyptian universities during Sadat's rule. The student association radicalized after Sadat visited Jerusalem and was in fact a critique of the peace with Israel, because it violates the rules of Sharia. Peace aroused discontent among the population, who was beginning to perceive the danger posed by unbelievers. The president was beginning to be labeled as unbeliever as well. In the Al-Jihad organization, Faraj was the main ideologue, and the work "The Neglected Duty" was considered the manifesto. The primary purpose of the group was to overthrow Sadat and establish an Islamic state based on Sharia.[41] The way in which this ideal can be achieved is jihad, in this situation the internal one. Sadat's killing was justified primarily by the fact that he is an apostate and therefore the law he makes is contrary to religious precepts, and the government as a whole is corrupt which inevitably leads to the decline of the Islamic world. In other words, the assassination was based on strictly ideological fundamentalist considerations arising from the group's manifesto.

### **5.State-Building according to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini**

Another model of fundamentalist movement that pursues state-building is the one promoted by Khomeini, who in his approach also uses the fundamental texts of Islam, which are perceived as sets of practices that have the necessary competence to regulate any aspect of life. As in the previous case, I aim to define the historical context in which the movement was outlined and substantiated.

Opposition movements are beginning to be heard, two notable figures articulating this radicalism were Ali Shariati, a French social scientist very popular in colleges and high schools and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who was exiled after accusing the Shah of capitulating in front of Americans in 1963.[42] The analysis of Khomeini's text "Governance of the Jurist" is of interest for this paper, because it is an Islamic fundamentalist text, in the sense that it represents a personalized interpretation of the original work and its prescriptions were outlined in the subsequent state construction.

In his approach, Khomeini incites a revolution through which the aspiration for the establishment of an Islamic state led by experts can be realized. He had a negative discourse in relation to the established elites and the overthrow of the corrupt non-Islamic state seemed essential. Khomeini began to speak out against the regime and its American allies. He denounces the Shah for corruption, neglect of rights, oppression of the masses and compromise of Iran's sovereignty.[43] Therefore, the main enemy is the corrupt non-Islamic government that manifests its oppression in various aspects, bringing in Muslim society an uncharacteristic lifestyle for believers, which involves both Western laws and their vices. The monarchy itself as a whole is a pagan institution incompatible with true Islam,[44] which, moreover, cannot be understood at its real value, separating the social from the spiritual realm. Islam does not recognize monarchy and hereditary succession.[45] This corrupt government keeps citizens in poverty and does not work for the benefit of society, also managing resources in an incompetent way. At the same time, foreign powers are exploiting Iran and keeping it in a state of retreat. The Muslim community is threatened by unbelief, sin, corruption, that are infiltrating society from outside. At the same time, for various reasons the Islamic community did not organize itself according to the model it needed. The current leaders, says Khomeini, are the puppets of



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imperialism and want to promote vices that in the Islamic world are considered wrong.[46] Therefore, Khomeini opts for an Islamic jurisprudence that is much more effective than the one installed now which is not able to judge and do efficient justice. The Islamic government should be based on the teachings of the sacred texts, but also be composed of members with expertise in Islam, those who have the knowledge. Khomeini saw the solution to the problems of social corruption and weak human nature through a government that will act as a primary educator.[47] Such an organization is legitimate, because it evokes the primary model of the Prophet. He was the first expert that had access to the knowledge of God, was able to send it to the people and apply it. Experts are legitimate because they are considered to be uncorrupted members who are able to read and interpret sacred texts in a much more correct manner than if they were done by other citizens without expertise. Faqih refers not only to those who have knowledge of the laws and judicial procedures of Islam, but also to those who have knowledge of religious doctrines, institutions, and ethics. So faqih is a religious expert in every sense of the word.[48] The prophet was an executor of the law and the prophet's successor must do the same.[49] Great emphasis is placed on the issue of social justice, meaning the dilution of socio-economic inequalities, and a possible Islamic government would gain legitimacy by restoring this justice and lifting out of poverty Muslims who do not have access to services and goods. The necessary provisions are formulated for the economic organization of society, otherwise, there is no area of life for which Islam does not propose rules and regulatory instructions. It is a school for those who fight against imperialism and for those who want freedom and independence.[50] In this context, according to Khomeini, a revolution is righteous, because Islam itself is by definition oriented against the system, so revolutionary, seen here as a mean of liberation, as opposed to domination and oppression. Islam is a religion of those who fight for justice and truth. He tries to justify the need for revolution through 2 instruments, once using theological-religious criteria and on the other hand using non-religious criteria, addressing certain things related to social and political issues that appeal to the people's sense. In other words, we can judge whether a government is effective or not, guided both by the precepts of the Qur'an and by a personal appreciation, in the sense that we perceive at the level of common sense that it is corrupt or not. Now, the goal of revolutionary Islam is to focus on jihad to establish theocracy. Political-religious duties such as dawa - preaching and social assistance, and hirja - separation or emigration, built on the model of the Prophet were placed at a lower level in relation to the obligation of jihad.[51]

Khomeini, who ruled from 1979 to 1989, ultimately assumed full authority, justifying this step as an adaptation of Islamic theology, backed by a radical ideology that promised a victory for Allah and the establishment of a world caliphate.[52] In 1979, the Shah's family was exiled and the Islamic Republic of Iran was proclaimed. Khomeini, on his return from exile, begins to work on drafting a constitution to be voted on in a referendum. There was a turnout of over 50%, with over 90% of the total votes for/pro, which were considered valid and voted by the majority of the population. The adopted constitution incorporated the vilayat-y faqih principle, the rule of an Islamic jurist in the name of the Imam,[53] Khomeini being the supreme leader.

Khomeini's ideology is of interest for this approach, as it has had a considerable impact on state-building and the organization of Iranian society. Islamic government is not constitutional in the current sense of the word. It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are the subject of conditions of government and administration of the country arising from the Qur'an.[54] A clarification should be made here that Islam is a religion and the Qur'an itself is



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theological book. Islam, even if it starts from the Qur'an, acquires a political and fundamentalist tone only after the process of interpretation, *itjihad*.

Therefore, the new constitution was the basis of the Iranian state and represents a unique construction in the sense that each secular institution is doubled by a religious one. Thus there was a double legitimacy, the democratic one, through elections and representation and on the other hand a religious one. The general electorate, defined as the totality of adults, including women, has the authority to elect by secret ballot, the president, the parliament, the local councils, but also the Assembly of Experts.[55] In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the president is the head of the executive power. The president is elected once every 4 years and can run for 2 terms. He chairs the cabinet, appoints ministers, ambassadors, governors, mayors and directors of the National Bank, the Iranian National Oil Company, and also is responsible for the annual budget and policy implementation.[56] Even under these conditions, the supreme leader remains a legitimate religious person whose authority exceeds the authority of the president. The supreme leader is elected for life by the Council of Wise Men which has a conjugate composition, half of the members being religious and the other part lay. Their basic task is to choose the supreme leader when the current one dies. So, we notice this institutional binomial president-supreme leader. Parliament is elected for 4 years and is described as the "representative of the people". It confirms the ministers elected by the president, but can withdraw its acceptance at any time, questions the president and his cabinet, approves the budget, credits and international treaties. At the same time, the parliament also holds closed meetings and regulates its internal way of working. Parliament has 270 members, but given the demographic growth, the total number could increase.[57] In parallel with the legislature which is elected in accordance with democratic principles, there is also the Assembly of Wise Men which approves candidates for parliament, presidency, mayor's office. In other words, it exercises a function of control over politics. In the institutional apparatus of Iran, there is also a Council of Guardians whose role is to monitor and control the legislative activity of the parliament, in this sense having the power to cancel certain laws or request amendments. All laws are sent to this court for examination. The Council of Guardians must ensure that the legislation does not contravene the precepts of Islam and the principles of the Constitution.[58] In parallel, taking into account the fact that the judiciary is diversified into distinct areas, the Guardians' Council also has a mediating role, managing conflicts between courts. This bipolarity is also transposed in the military field, two armies can be distinguished. In order to consolidate and advance the revolution, several specialized bodies were created for this purpose, including the Revolutionary Guard, designed to impose and apply the revolution.[59] This Guard is directly subordinated to the supreme leader, the president having the powers to manage only the usual one.

## **6. Conclusion**

Following the presentation of two fundamentalist Islamic movements, I will summarize the similarities and differences between the two in terms of how society is organized and what kind of solutions are proposed for this purpose. *Itjihad*, namely the activity of interpretation and analysis of sacred texts is an essential issue in the broad framework of Islamic fundamentalism. This creates difficulties in determining the court that should deal with it and generates different solutions, both of which are seen as presenting a truth about the purposes and means by which the community is organized or the access to knowledge is regulated. Faraj places great emphasis on individual knowledge of sacred texts, through which the individual perceives how he should



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act. The correct particular understanding of the texts leads to an awareness of the duty that people have. After reading, the Muslim should understand the way and purpose for which he should use jihad. In other words, individual knowledge brings an understanding and assumption of moral and political duty.

Khomeini however, presents an alternative. It assigns a central role to the activity of knowledge to an authority with expertise. An individual knowledge would generate inconsistency in the application of the law and would thus lead to conflicts within the community of believers. Experts have legitimacy because they are not corrupt and have skills in analyzing and interpreting sacred texts, much greater than other citizens.

In addition to the political dimension, both address social issues, challenging the decline in the living standards of the population justified by the inefficiency of a secular government that is unable to manage resources for the good of its citizens. Both want to reduce socio-economic inequalities and ensure access to primary goods. They call for revolution to be able to establish an Islamic state that would later expand.

In his manifesto, Faraj superficially addresses the form that the eventual state will take. It does not talk about what the separation of powers will look like and who will hold that powers. It only emphasizes the need to cleanse the secular system of corrupt officials and take over leadership positions by correct Muslims. Khomeini advances more deeply in this field. He manages to draft a constitution in which presents the institutional body of the state, bringing in this regard an innovation that consists in a unique formula for the separation and doubling of secular and religious powers.

No term has become as associated with Islam as jihad. This is often divided between big jihad and small jihad, the former defining the personal struggle for a perfect spiritual life, while the latter involving everything from missionary activities to holy war. For Faraj, the struggle that individuals must wage is mainly justified by appealing to theological-religious criteria by which struggle becomes an individual moral obligation. Khomeini however, uses both theological-religious arguments and arguments of a non-religious nature. They both talk about jihad, but for Faraj, it is central and there are no other alternatives to fight the apostates. The cause that Faraj was fighting for through his movement was the overthrow of the authoritarian regime while Khomeini uses the infallible truths of sacred texts as a source of legitimization.

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